Restitution - Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit - Amount of Recovery Where There Has Been a Sale by Renfrew, Charles B., S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 55 Issue 1 
1956 
Restitution - Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit - Amount of 
Recovery Where There Has Been a Sale 
Charles B. Renfrew S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Legal Remedies Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles B. Renfrew S.Ed., Restitution - Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit - Amount of Recovery Where 
There Has Been a Sale, 55 MICH. L. REV. 143 (1956). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/15 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1956] RECENT DECISIONS 143 
REsTITUTION-WAIVER OF TORT AND SUIT IN AsSUMPSIT-.AMOUNT OF 
RECOVERY WHERE THERE HAS BEEN A SALE-In a prior action one of the 
defendants obtained a judgment against the plaintiff. The present action 
for conversion was brought because of an allegedly irregular execution sale 
of plaintiff's business property under that judgment. The trial court 
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granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was 
barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, held, affirmed. The 
applicable statute of limitations was not tolled by fraudulent concealment! 
and plaintiff, having elected his remedy in tort, was not entitled to a trial 
in an action of assumpsit on the theory of a contract implied by law. The 
court also found that under the Judicature Act of 19152 any assumpsit 
recovery would be limited to the proceeds of the sale. One justice dissented 
from this view on the ground that the assumpsit action provided for in the 
act did not eliminate assumpsit on the common counts as a restitutionary 
remedy, and that recovery on such counts should not be limited to the 
proceeds of a sale by the wrongdoer. Janiszewski v. Behrmann, 345 Mich. 
8, 75 N.W. (2d) 77 (1956). . 
The court's use of the doctrine of election of remedies in the principal 
case is questionable. To charge a litigant with the consequences of having 
elected a remedy there must be two or more remedies available to him.3 
At the time plaintiff filed his action in tort the three year statute of limi-
tations had already barred it. It would appear that the present case in-
volved a mistake as to the availability of a remedy rather than an election 
of remedies.4 The overwhelming weight of authority is that there can be 
no election if one of the remedies is barred by the statute of limitations.5 
Apart from ele~tion of remedies, the principal case is notable for its dis-
cussion of the availability of assumpsit and the amount of recovery in the 
case of a sale of converted personal property. Although it has been almost 
universally recognized that an owner can waive the tort and sue· in assump-
sit for property tortiously taken,6 there is no agreement about the necessity 
of a sale by the tort-feasor as an element of the cause of action. The modem 
trend and majority· view is that the absence of a sale does not prohibit 
recovery,7 wh~reas the minority view, which is followed by Michigan,s 
. 1 Plaintiff argued that he did not know of his statutory exemptions and of the irregu-
larities in the execution sale until 1954, and that the statute of limitations should begin 
-to run at that time. Both the majority and the dissent agreed, however, that since the acts 
of the defendants were open and notorious, and since they were under no duty to inform 
the plaintiff of his legal rights, that the statute of limitations ran from the date of the 
sale-the alleged conversion. 
2 Mich. Comp Laws (1948) §611.1. 
a Hansen v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 267 Mich. 224, 255 N.W. 192 (1934); Kruk v. 
Minneapolis, St. P. 8: S.S.M. Ry. Co., 249 Mich. 685, 229 N.W. 479 (1930). 
4 "The law has not gone so far as to deprive parties of meritorious claims merely 
because of attempts to collect them by inappropriate action, upon which recovery could 
not be had." McLaughlin v. Austin, 104 Mich. 489 at 491, 62 N.W. 719 (1895). 
5 See 28 C.J.S., Election of Remedies §12, p. 1084 (1941). There is an early case in 
which a plaintiff, defeated by the statute of limitations in an action of assumpsit, was held 
not to be able to bring an action for fraud and deceit. Black v. Miller, 75 Mich. 323, 42 
N.W. 837 (1889). 
6 See the cases collected in 18 AM. JUR., Election of Remedies §44, p. 163, n. 18 (1938). 
7 Felder v. Reeth, (9th Cir. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 744; WoonwARD, QUASI CONTRACTS §273, 
pp. 440-441 (1913); 97 A.L.R. 250 at 261 (1935); REsrrrurION REsrATEMENT §151 (1937). 
8 Jones. v. Hoar, 22 Mass .. 285 (1827); Ward v. Warner, 8 Mich. 508 (1860); Watson v. 
Stever, 25 Mich. _386 (1872); Tolan v. Hodgeboom, 38 Mich. 624 (1878); St. John v. Antrim 
Iron Co., 122 Mich. 68, 80 N.W. 998 (1899). · 
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requires a sale in order to establish a cause of action in assumpsit.9 The 
majority in the principal case said that an action of assumpsit in the case 
of the conversion of personal property into money was covered by the 
Judicature Act of 1915,10 and that under the statute recovery was limited 
to the proceeds of the sale.11 Justice Smith, dissenting, distinguished be-
tween an action for damages and an action for restitution, and stated that 
the Judicature Act of 1915, which permitted an action in assumpsit for 
damages, did not eliminate the availability of assumpsit on the common 
counts as a restitutionary remedy.12 He agreed that an action under the 
statute would be barred by the three year statute of limitations applicable 
to all damage actions,18 but he disagreed with the majority as to the amount 
of recovery permitted under the statute, holding recovery of all just dam-
ages sustained by the plaintiff should be allowed. He argued that the 
present action, however, was not brought for damages under the statute, 
but was a quasi-contract action covered by the six year statute of limita-
tions applicable to promissory obligations.14 Accepting the requirement 
of a sale laid down by Watson v. Stever,15 Justice Smith stated that under 
the common law of Michigan the recovery should not be limited to the 
proceeds of the sale but should be the value of the property as of the time 
of the conversion.16 Yet recovery limited to the proceeds is a logical conse-
quence of accepting the requirement of a sale in order to establish a cause 
9 Where there is a contractual relationship betlveen the parties the Michigan authori-
ties allow assumpsit to be brought in the absence of a sale. Tuttle v. Campbell, 74 Mich. 
652, 42 N.W. 384 (1889); McLaughlin v. Salley, 46 Mich. 219, 9 N.W. 256 (1881); Figuet 
v. Allison, 12 Mich. 328 (1864). 
10 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §611.1. 
11 In reaching this decision the majority was required to hold that the last sentence 
of this section stating, "In all such cases where assumpsit is brought, a promise shall be 
implied by law to pay all just damages sustained by plaintiff and may be so declared 
upon," was applicable only when assumpsit was brought in the case of a penalty or a for-
feiture. This holding is hard to justify either on the basis of the grammatical structure 
of the section or in the light of its legislative history. Justice Smith's dissent points out 
the weakness of this position. 
12 Surely the Judicature Act of 1915 was not intended to limit the availability of 
assumpsit to the situations listed: trespass on land, fraud and deceit, conversion of per-
sonal property into money, and penalty and forfeiture; but there might be a real question 
whether in those situations assumpsit can be used to provide a quasi-contract remedy 
which is independent of the statute. 
13 Mich. Comp·. Laws (1948) §609.13. 
14 For a criticism of applying different statutes of limitations see Corbin, ""Waiver of 
Tort and Suit in Assumpsit," 19 YALE L.J. 221 (1910). For a criticism of Corbin's views 
see House, "Unjust Enrichment: The Applicable Statute of Limitations," 35 CORN. L.Q. 
797 (1950). 
15 25 Mich. 386 (1872). 
16 It is questionable that such a recovery has been permitted in Michigan. Although 
it appears never to have been squarely decidecj., there is dicta to the effect that recovery 
is limited to the amount of the proceeds of the sale. Lyon v. Clark, 129 Mich. 381, 88 
N.W. 1046 (1902); Nelson v. Kilbride, 113 Mich. 637, 71 N.W. 1089 (1897). This is the 
recovery allowed in other jurisdictions which follow Jones v. Hoar, note 8 supra. See 97 
A.L.R. 250 at pp. 275-276 (1935). Jurisdictions which do not require a sale permit recovery 
for the value of the property at the time of the conversion. Felder v. Reeth, note 7 supra. 
See Justice Cooley's opinion in Watson v. Stever, note 8 supra, at 387, as to why the court 
declined to allow recovery on the count for goods sold and delivered. 
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of action in assumpsit. The solution to this problem, it is urged, is to be 
found in overruling Watson v. Stever11 as to the requirement of a sale in 
order to establish a cause of action in assumpsit. This would be in accord 
with the majority of American jurisdictions. The attention of the court 
should be concentrated on the original benefit obtained by the wrongdoer 
rather than on the fictional promise contained in an action for assumpsit.lB 
Charles B. Renfrew, S.Ed. 
17 Note 8 supra. 
18 For an excellent discussion of the concept of benefits see 46 MICH. L. REv. 543 (1948). 
